三.Read the following paragraphs from an article titled "'Legal Feminism and the Emotions: Three Moments in anEvolving Relationship" (Abrams 2005: 336-337) and translate into Chinese. (20%)
(A) Scholarship on the Emotions in the Constructivist MomentRecent work on the emotions and law has continued to proliferate in the legal academy, as well as in thefields of philosophy and political theory. It has pressed in ncw directions, some of which, interestingly, reflectfeminist and related critiques of enlightenment epistemology. Recent work, for example, is less focused onchallenging the dichotomous hierarchical upderstanding of reason and the emotions, or the inappropriateness ofemotion to the law.43 Reason and emotion are more often described as interpenetrating in effective thought orsound legal argumentation.44 More notably, emotion itself is sometimes characterized as having a cognitiveelement or cognitive structure. Martha Nussbauim has argued, for example, that disgust is an expression ofrevulsion toward those attributes that reveal our animality.45 William Miller, comparing disgust and contempt,notes the different ways that the lips curl in the physical expres sion of each； but he also distinguishes contemptand disgust on the ground that contempt connotes a superior hierarchical relation to its objects, while disgustdemands their exile or abjection. 46Second, recent scholarship refects the view that emotions (be they visceral or cognitive) are not theexpression of purely interior states. They are shaped and conditioned-in their forn and in the objects to which theyrespond-by social understandings and practices. Cheshire Calhoun has argued, for example, that romantic love-anemotion our culture has often regarded as the last outpost of the natural-is powerfully structured, or evenproduced, by elaborate social scripts.47Similarly, recent scholarship does not characterize emotion simply as being expressed, or repressed, by law.Although contemporary scholarship on the emotions still reflects accounts in which law plays an expressive rolewith respect to particular emotions-Dan Kahan's work on the expressive functions of the criminal law is a goodexample of that tendency48-more recent accounts describe emotion as acted on, modified, and brought intobeing by law in many different ways. Recent work by Martha Minow, for example, on legal responses to genocideand related atrocities, stresses the way in which fact-finding can channel emotions away from uncontrolled hungerfor vengeance toward a more moderated desire for accountability.49 Robert Solomon describes the way thatPriminal law can temper, even as it gives effect to, the desire for retribution.50 Danielle Allen, writing aboutancient A thens, describes the way in which law need not simply express, but can also satisfy, anger at individualoffenses against the community.5143.